This paper investigates a class of multi-player discrete games where each player aims to maximize its own utility function. Each player does not know the other players' action sets, their deployed actions or the structures of its own or the others' utility functions. Instead, each player only knows its own deployed actions and its received utility values in recent history. We propose a reinforcement learning algorithm which converges to the set of action profiles which have maximal stochastic potential with probability one. Furthermore, the convergence rate of the proposed algorithm is quantified. The algorithm performance is verified using two case studies in the smart grid and cybersecurity.
Introduction
Game theory provides a mathematically rigorous framework for multiple players to reason about each other. In recent years, game theoretic learning has been increasingly used to control large-scale networked systems due to its inherent distributed nature. In particular, the network-wide objective of interest is encoded as a game whose Nash equilibria correspond to desired networkwide configurations. Numerical algorithms are then synthesized for the players to identify Nash equilibria via repeated interactions. Multi-player games can be categorized into discrete games and continuous games. In a discrete (resp. continuous) game, each player has a finite (resp. an infinite) number of action candidates. As for discrete games, learning algorithms include bestresponse dynamics, better-response dynamics, factitious Z. Hu and M. Zhu were partially supported by ARO W911NF-13-1-0421 (MURI), NSA H98230-15-1-0289 and NSF ECCS-1710859. P. Chen and P. Liu were partially supported by ARO W911NF-13-1-0421 (MURI) and NSF CNS-1422594.
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play, regret matching, logit-based dynamics and replicator dynamics. Please refer to (Basar and Olsder, 1999; Fudenberg and Levine, 1998; Sandholm, 2010; Young, 2001 ) for detailed discussion. As an important class of continuous games, generalized Nash games were first formulated in Arrow and Debreu (1954) , and see survey paper Facchinei and Kanzow (2007) for a comprehensive exposition. A number of algorithms have been proposed to compute generalized Nash equilibria, including, to name a few, ODE-based methods Rosen (1965) , nonlinear Gauss-Seidel-type approaches Pang et al. (2008) , iterative primal-dual Tikhonov schemes Yin et al. (2011) , and best-response dynamics Palomar and Eldar (2010) . Game theory and its learning have found many applications; e.g., traffic routing in Internet Altman et al. (2002) , urban transportation Roumboutsos and Kapros (2008) , mobile robot coordination (Arslan et al., 2007; Hatanaka et al., 2016) and power markets (Wang et al., 2012; Zhu, 2014) .
In many applications, players can only access limited information about the game of interest. For example, each player may not know the structure of its own utility function. Additionally, during repeated interactions, each player may not be aware of the actions of other players. These informational constraints motivate recent study on payoff-based or reinforcement learning algorithms where the players adjust their actions only based on their own previous actions and utility measurements. The papers (Marden et al., 2009; Zhu and Martínez, 2013; Hatanaka et al., 2016 ) study discrete games, and their approaches are based on stochastic stability Foster and Young (1990) . As mentioned in Remark 3.2 of Zhu and Martínez (2013) , paper Marden et al. (2009) proposes an algorithm to find Nash equilibrium of weakly acyclic games with an arbitrarily high probability by choosing an arbitrarily small and fixed exploration rate in advance. The analysis in Marden et al. (2009) is based on homogeneous Markov chains and more specifically the theory of resistance trees Young (1993) . Zhu and Martínez (2013) extends the results in Marden et al. (2009) by adopting diminishing exploration rates and ensures convergence to Nash equilibrium and global optima with probability one. The analysis of Zhu and Martínez (2013) is based on based on strong ergodicity of inhomogeneous Markov chains. As for continuous games, the papers (Frihauf et al., 2012; Liu and Krstic, 2011; Stankovic et al., 2012) employ extremum seeking and the paper Zhu and Frazzoli (2016) uses finite-difference approximations to estimate unknown partial (sub)gradients. Notice that all the aforementioned papers focus on asymptotic convergence and none of them quantifies convergence rates.
Contribution:
In this paper, we study a class of multiplayer discrete games where each player is unaware of the other players' action sets, their deployed actions or the structures of its own or the others' utility functions. We propose a reinforcement learning algorithm where, at each iteration, each player, on one hand, exploits successful actions in recent history via comparing received utility values, and on the other hand, randomly explores any feasible action with a certain exploration rate. The algorithm is proven to be convergent to the set of action profiles with maximum stochastic potential with probability one. Furthermore, an upper bound on the convergence rate is derived and is minimized when the exploration rates are restricted to p-series. When the interactions of the players consist of a weakly acyclic game and the received utilities are subject to uniformly bounded random noises, the convergence to the set of pure anti-E-Nash equilibria is guaranteed. The algorithm performance is verified using two case studies in the smart grid and cybersecurity. A preliminary version of this paper was published in Zhu et al. (2014) where convergence rates and measurement noises are not discussed. Further, Zhu et al. (2014) focuses on the application on adaptive cyber defense, and this paper focuses on theory of learning in games. The analysis of two papers is significantly different.
Problem formulation and learning algorithm
In this section, we introduce a class of multi-player games where the information each player accesses is limited. Then, we present a learning algorithm under which the action profiles of the players converge to the set of action profiles which have maximum stochastic potential.
Game formulation
The system model in Figure 1 characterizes the interactions of N players in a non-cooperative game. Each component in the figure will be discussed in the following paragraphs.
Players. We consider N players V {1, · · · , N } and each player has a finite set of actions. Let A i denote the action set of player i and a i ∈ A i denote an action of player i. Denote S A 1 × · · · × A N as the Cartesian product of the action sets, where s (a 1 , · · · , a N ) ∈ S is denoted as an action profile of the players.
Utility. Under the influence of an action profile, the system generates a utility value for each player. The utility function for player i ∈ V is defined as u i : S → R. At the end of iteration t, the utility value u i (t) = u i (s(t)) is measured and sent to player i. The utility value received by player i is denoted byũ i (t) u i (t) + w i (t), where w i (t) is the measurement noise.
Informational constraint. Each player does not know the other players' action sets or their deployed actions. Besides, each player is unaware of the structure of its own or the others' utility functions. At iteration t, each player only knows its deployed actions and its received utility values in the past; i.e.,
The above informational constraint has been studied in several recent papers. For example, the authors in (Zhu and Martínez, 2013; Stankovic et al., 2012; Hatanaka et al., 2016) investigate coverage optimization problems for mobile sensor networks where mobile sensors are unaware of environmental distribution functions. The au-thors in Marden et al. (2013) study the problem of optimizing energy production in wind farms where each turbine knows neither the functional form of the power generated by the wind farm nor the choices of other turbines. The authors in (Frihauf et al., 2012; Zhu and Frazzoli, 2016) consider convex games where each player cannot access its game components.
Problem statement
Under the above informational constraint, we aim to synthesize a learning algorithm under which the action profiles of the players converge to the set of action profiles with maximum stochastic potential. We will quantify the convergence rate of the proposed algorithm in contrast to asymptotic convergence in existing work.
Learning algorithm
Inspired by Zhu and Martínez (2013) , we propose a learning algorithm called the RL algorithm, where each player updates its actions only based on its previous actions and its received utility values. On the one hand, each player chooses the most successful action in recent history. It represents the exploitation phase. However, the exploitation is not sufficient to guarantee that the player can choose the best action given others'. So on the other hand, the player uniformly chooses one action from its action set. It represents the exploration phase. The specific update rule is stated in the RL algorithm. At iterations t = 0 and t = 1, each player uniformly chooses one action from its action set as initialization (Line 3). Starting from iteration t = 2, with probability 1 −˜ i (t), player i chooses the action which generates a higher utility value in last two iterations as current action (Line 8-13). This represents the exploitation where player i reinforces its previous successful actions. With probability˜ i (t), player i uniformly selects an action from its action set A i (Line 14). This represents the exploration and makes sure that each action profile is selected infinitely often. Note that sample(A i ) in Line 14 represents uniformly choosing one element from set A i .
Analysis
In this section, we will present the analytical results of the RL algorithm.
Notations and assumptions
We first introduce the notations and assumptions used throughout the paper. Denote by |V| the cardinality of player set, |A i | the cardinality of action set of player i and |A| ∞ max i∈V |A i | the maximum cardinality among all action sets. The exploration rate for player i at iteration t is decomposed into two parts; i.e.,˜ i (t) i (t) + e i (t), for i ∈ V do 3:
end for 5: end while 6: while t ≥ 2 do 7:
With prob. (1 −˜ i (t)), 9: 
is common for all the players and e i (t) represents the exploration deviation. Define e(t)
we define e r (t) ||e(t)||
Here we denote by || · || ∞ the infinity norm of a vector. In addition, we also use || · || to represent the L 1 -norm of a vector, and ||P || to represent the 1-norm of a matrix. We assume the measurement noises satisfy:
Assumption 1 For each i ∈ V, {w i (t)} t≥0 is a sequence of real-valued random variables that are independent and identically distributed (I.I.D.).
I.I.D. random noises are widely adopted in distributed control and optimization problems and see (Xiao et al., 2007; Huang and Manton, 2009 ). In addition, we assume the exploration rates satisfy:
Assumption 2 (1). For each i ∈ V, i (t) ∈ (0, 1] is non-negative, strictly decreasing, and lim t→∞ i (t) = 0.(2).
Assumption 2 indicates that the players can choose heterogeneous exploration rates. The exploration rates diminish slowly enough and their deviations decrease in faster rates than the common part. In the paper Zhu and Martínez (2013) , it is assumed that exploration rates i (t) are identical for all i, diminishing and not summable. Assumption 2 allows for heterogeneous exploration rates and includes homogeneous exploration rates in the paper Zhu and Martínez (2013) as a special case. Actually, papers (Koshal et al., 2013; Yousefian et al., 2013 ) adopt heterogenous step-sizes for distributed optimization and game theory. They impose similar assumptions on the step-sizes.
Markov chain induced by the RL algorithm. Denote by Z S × S the state space, where each state z(t) (s(t), s(t + 1)) consists of the action profiles at iteration t and the next iteration. And denote by diag(S × S) {(s, s)|s ∈ S} the diagonal space of Z. By the definition of z(t), the sequence {z(t)} t≥0 forms a time-inhomogeneous Markov chain, denoted by M. We define P˜ (t) as the transition matrix of Markov chain M at iteration t, where each entry P˜ (t) (z , z) represents the transition probability from state z to z. Besides, denote by π(t) the distribution on Z at iteration t.
z-tree of time-homogenous Markov chain M˜ . Given any two distinct states z and z of Markov chain M˜ , consider all paths starting from z and ending at z. Denote by p z z the largest probability among all possible paths from z to z. A path might contain intermediate states z 1 , · · · , z k (k = 0 means there is no intermediate state) between z and z. So p z z is the product of P˜ (z , z 1 ), P˜ (z 1 , z 2 ), · · · , P˜ (z k , z). We define graph G(˜ ) where each vertex of G(˜ ) is a state z of Markov chain M˜ and the probability on edge (z , z) is p z z . A z-tree on G(˜ ) is a spanning tree rooted at z such that from every vertex z = z, there is a unique path from z to z. Denote by G˜ (z) the set of all z-trees on G(˜ ). The total probability of a z-tree is the product of the probabilities of its edges. The stochastic potential of the state z is the largest total probability among all z-trees in G˜ (z). Let Λ(˜ ) be the states which have maximum stochastic potential for a particular˜ ∈ (0, 1]. Denote the limit set Λ * lim →0 Λ(˜ ). And the elements in Λ * are referred to as stochastically stable states.
Remark 1
The above notions are inspired by the resistance trees theory Young (1993) . However, the above notions are defined for any˜ ∈ (0, 1] instead of˜ → 0 in the resistance trees theory. This allows us to characterize the transient performance of the RL algorithm. 2
Main analytical result
The following theorem is the main analytical result of this paper. It shows that the state z(t) converges to the set of stochastically stable state with probability one. Moreover, the convergence rate is quantified using the distance between π(t) and the limiting distribution π * ; i.e., D(t) ||π(t) − π * ||. The formal proof of Theorem 1 will be given in Section 5.
Theorem 1 Let Assumptions 1 -2 hold, the following properties hold for the RL algorithm: (P1) lim t→∞ P r{z(t) ∈ Λ * } = 1 and Λ * ⊆ diag(S × S);
(P2) there exist positive integer t min and positive constant C such that for any t * > t min and t ≥ t * + 1, the following is true:
(1)
Discussion

Weakly acyclic games
In this section, we study the special case where the interactions of the players consist of a weakly acyclic game. A game is called to be weakly acyclic if from every action profile, there exists a finite best-response improvement path leading from the action profile to a pure Nash equilibrium. In addition, we further assume that the measurement noises are uniformly upper bounded.
Assumption 3 There is constant E ≥ 0, such that |w i (t)| ≤ E, ∀i ∈ V and t ≥ 0.
We will show the convergence of the RL algorithm to the set of equilibria defined as follows when the game is weakly acyclic.
Remark 2 Anti-E-Nash equilibrium is stronger than pure Nash equilibrium and E-approximate Nash equilibrium Nisan et al. (2007) . When E = 0, anti-E-Nash equilibrium reduces to Nash equilibrium. In the Eapproximate Nash equilibrium, the inequality becomes
So any anti-E-Nash equilibrium is also a Nash equilibrium and any Nash equilibrium is an E-approximate Nash equilibrium. The reverses are not true in general. 2
Denote the set of anti-E-Nash equilibria of the game Γ as
The following corollary implies that the action profiles converge to N E − (Γ) with probability one.
Corollary 1 If Assumptions 1 -3 hold, Γ is a weakly acyclic game and N E − (Γ) = ∅, then it holds that lim
From Theorem 1, we have lim t→∞ P r{z(t) ∈ Λ * } = 1 and
Then following the proofs of Lemma 4.2 and Claims 3 -4 in the Proposition 4.3 in Zhu and Martínez (2013) , we can get that Λ
Remark 3 As shown in (Zhu and Martínez, 2013; Marden et al., 2009) , when games are weakly acyclic, stochastically stable states are contained in the set of pure Nash equilibrium. Towards our best knowledge, weakly acyclic games are the most general ones which have such property. When a game is not weakly acyclic, stochastically stable states can still be used to characterize where the algorithm converges. So, stochastically stable states are of broader applicability than pure Nash equilibrium. 2
Estimate of constant C in inequality (1)
The following corollary estimates constant C in inequality (1) when the measurement noises are absent. For presentation simplicity, denote |γ| min min i∈V γ i ,
Corollary 2 If Assumptions 1 -2 hold, w i (t) = 0 and the exploration rates satisfy that
The proof of Corollary 2 will be given in Section 5.4.
Explicit convergence rate
If the exploration rates and exploration deviations are given, we can explicitly quantify how fast the algorithm will reach the set Λ * . Assume the exploration rate for player i is 1 |Ai|t 1/N , and the exploration deviations are e i (t) = 0, ∀i ∈ V. By Theorem 1, we have:
The second inequality of (2) is a result of inequality (2) of Chlebus (2009) 
Optimal exploration rates
An interesting question is how to choose the exploration rates to minimize the upper bound in inequality (1). This is an infinite-dimension and non-convex optimization problem and hard to solve in general. For analytical tractability, we restrict the exploration rates to be p-series which have been widely used in stochastic approximation and convex optimization (Bertsekas, 2015; Hasminskii and Silver, 1972; Kushner and Yin, 2003) . In particular, let e i (t) = 0 and i (t) = 1
The second inequality of (3) follows the same steps of (2) by replacing
Since lim
t→∞ t 1−p 1−p p N ln t = ∞, we have lim t→∞ exp( −t 1−p 1−p ) exp(− p N ln t) = 0. So the term 1 t p/N dominates the term C(2 exp(1 + (t * −1) 1−p 1−p ) exp( −t 1−p 1−p ) as t increases. When p = 1, in- equality (3) becomes: D(t) ≤ C(2 exp(1 + ln(t * − 1) − ln t) + 1 t * 1/N + 1 t 1/N ) = C(2 exp(1 + ln(t * − 1)) 1 t + 1 t * 1/N + 1 |Ai|t 1/N is optimal among p-series.
Memory and communication
The RL algorithm only requires each player to remember its own utility values and actions in recent history. So the memory cost is low. In addition, communications are case dependent. In Zhu and Martínez (2013) , the utility function of each robot only depends on the actions of its own and nearby robots. The communication range of each robot is twice of its sensing range. So the communication graphs are time-varying and usually sparse. In Section 6.1, each customer can communicate with the system operator. So the communication graph is a fixed star graph.
Proofs
We will prove Theorem 1 and Corollary 2 in this section.
Analysis of the H-RL algorithm
For the sake of analysis, we introduce the H-RL algorithm, which has time-homogeneous exploration rates; i.e.,˜ (t) =˜ ∈ (0, 1], ∀t ≥ 0 in the RL algorithm. Then {z(t)} in the H-RL algorithm forms a time-homogeneous Markov chain M˜ withbe the transition matrix P˜ . The analysis of the H-RL algorithm provides preliminary results for that of the RL algorithm. The following lemma studies the properties of the feasible transitions in the Markov chain M˜ .
Lemma 1 Given any˜ ∈ (0, 1], if Assumption 1 holds, then each nonzero entry in transition matrix P˜ is a polynomial of the variables {˜ i , 1 −˜ i } i∈V . In addition, the coefficients of the polynomials are independent of˜ . PROOF. Consider any two states x, y ∈ Z that the transition from x to y is feasible within one step. In particular, x = (s(0), s(1)) and y = (s(1), s(2)), where s(t) = (a 1 (t), · · · , a N (t)) for t ∈ {0, 1, 2}. And the transition probability is P˜ (x, y) = i∈V P r{a
If player i performs exploitation with a
, we call this event a mis-exploitation between s(0) and s(1). By Assumption 1, the mis-exploitation between s(0) and s(1) of player i happens with probability
. The probability δ i (s(0), s(1)) is independent of˜ and only determined by the two utility values u i (s(0)) and u i (s(1)) because {w i (t)} t≥0 are I.I.D. Given states x and y, the set of players can be partitioned into three sets:
|Ai| . And for any j ∈ V ex (x, y), a j (2) can be achieved by exploitation without mis-exploitation or exploration, then P r{a
Then the transition probability can be written as:
It is clear that P˜ (x, y) is a polynomial of {˜ i , 1 −˜ i } i∈V with coefficients independent of˜ . 2
Given any˜ ∈ (0, 1], define stochastic vector π * (˜ ) as the stationary distribution of the Markov chain M˜ ; i.e., π
In the H-RL algorithm, when a player performs exploration, it can choose any element in its action set. One can see that, for any pair of states x, y ∈ Z, y can be reached from x within finite steps, and Markov chain M˜ is ergodic. By Lemma 3.1 in Chapter 6 of Freidlin et al. (2012) , π * (˜ ) can be written as follows:
where π *
P˜ (z , z) and E(T ) is the edge set of tree T .
Stationary distributions without exploration deviations
Now let us consider an auxiliary scenario that exploration deviations e i (t) = 0 for all t and for all i ∈ V. Then stochastic vectorπ
T has the same form of (5) with exploration deviations being 0. For notational simplicity, we refer toπ * ( (t)) asπ * (t). The following lemma shows that {π * (t)} t≥0 converges to a limiting distribution with a certain rate, and the support of the limiting distribution is Λ * .
Lemma 2 If Assumptions 1 -2 hold and e i (t) = 0 for all t and all i, then the sequence {π * (t)} t≥0 converges to the limiting distribution π * whose support is Λ * ⊆ diag(S × S). Moreover, the convergence rate could be quantified as:
PROOF. The proof is divided into two claims.
exists, and its support is Λ * ⊆ diag(S × S).
PROOF. By Lemma 1, for any (t) ∈ (0, 1], the nonzero entries of P (t) are polynomials of { i (t), 1 − i (t)} since e i (t) = 0 for all i ∈ V with time-homogeneous coefficients. Then σ z ( (t)) and z ∈Z σ z ( (t)) are polynomials of { i (t), 1 − i (t)} with time-homogeneous coefficients. Recall that i (t) = γ i c (t). For particular state z ∈ Z, σ z ( (t)) and z ∈Z σ z ( (t)) are polynomials of c (t), and π * z ( (t)) is a ratio of two polynomials of c (t):
In particular,
where k ≥ 0. Without loss of generality, we assume that of b k is non-zero. When
β( c (t)) . Then the limit of thê π * z ( (t)) can be represented as π * z = lim 
, therefore the support of π * is contained in Λ * .
For any (t) ∈ (0, 1] Assume a state z = (s(0), s(1)) ∈ Λ( (t)) but z ∈ diag(S × S), i.e., s(0) = s(1), where
, then there is a tree T max ( (t)) rooted at z such that it has largest total probability. We construct a tree T by adding the following path from z to z = (s(2), s(2)), wherê z = (s(1), s(2)), where s(2) = (a 1 (2), · · · , a N (2)) and
{u i (s(τ ))}), ∀i:
|Ai| .
Let us consider the edge leaving z :
where s(3) = (a 1 (3), · · · , a N (3)) with at least one player i such that a i (3) = a i (2). That is |V er (z , z )| ≥ 1. Then the transition probability of the leaving edge satisfies:
By Assumption 1, δ i (s, s ) is non-negative constant and independent of (t) for all i ∈ V and s, s ∈ S. Then P (t) (z,ẑ), P (t) (ẑ, z ) and P (t) (z , z ) are dominated by their lowest degree terms when (t) is sufficiently small. In particular, the lowest degree terms of P (t) (z,ẑ) and P (t) (ẑ, z ) are constant terms while the lowest degree term P (t) (z , z ) is at least first-degree term. Then there exists someˆ M ∈ (0, 1] such that
. That is, the total probability of T is larger than that of T max ( (t)). We reach a contradiction. Therefore, Λ * ⊆ diag(S × S) because Λ( (t)) ⊆ diag(S × S) holds for any sufficiently small (t). 2 Claim 2. ||π * (t) − π * || ≤ C || (t)|| ∞ for some constant C > 0.
PROOF. From Claim 1, we have lim
where L z and L are linear functions, the constant term of L is non-zero. And by Assumption 2 -(1), for any
is uniformly bounded. Remember that we fix i 0 at the beginning. And we can always chooses a constant
The following lemma shows that the sequence {||π * (t) − π * (t+1)||} t≥0 is summable and gives the explicit partial sums of the sequence when t is large.
Lemma 3 If Assumptions 1 -2 hold and e i (t) = 0 for all t and all i, then
over, there exists a t i0 such that the partial sum satis-
PROOF. In this paper, for any vector, we choose the
Recall equation (6), for any z ∈ Z,π *
β( c (t)) is a ratio of two polynomials of c (t). Then the derivative ofπ * z ( (t)) is:
where
can be rewritten as ∂ c (t) is the sign of c z l , ∀0 < c (t) ≤¯ c . By Assumption 2 -(1), c (t) strictly decreases to 0, there exists a t i0 such that c (t i0 ) ≤¯ c . We can define a partition of Z as follows:
Then equality (8) becomes:
Now we consider the partial sum t τ =t i ||π * (τ ) −π * (τ + 1)|| when t i > t i0 and t > t i . By equality (9), we have:
Proof of Theorem 1
Lemma 2 shows thatπ * (t) → π * whose support is Λ * . Now we proceed to finish the proofs of Theorem 1 by showing π(t) → π * and quantifying its convergence rate.
PROOF. Based on triangle inequality, we can get for any t ≥ 2,
We want to prove that the two terms in the right-hand side of (10) converge to 0 with certain rates.
Claim 3. lim t→∞ ||π(t) − π * || = 0 and there exists some t ∨ such that for any t * 3 > t ∨ and t > t *
PROOF. Based on triangle inequality, we can get for all t ≥ 2,
whereπ(t) is the distribution on Z at t when the exploration deviations e i (t) = 0 for all i ∈ V. Let x(t) ||π(t) −π * (t)|| and y(t) ||π * (t) − π * ||.
Let us first consider x(t). Note thatπ
T . Then we have:
By (4) in the proof of Lemma 1, the nonzero entries in {P (t−1) } T can be represented as polynomials of { i (t − 1), 1 − i (t − 1)}. Taking the nonzero entry
|Ai| , we can decompose {P (t−1) } T into the following:
where Q is a |Z| × |Z| matrix with all entries are 1. Because P (t−1) is a transition matrix, then the {P (t−1) } T is a column stochastic matrix where each column sum is equal to 1. It follows that the column sums of
, and the column sums of R(t − 1)
By (1) 
1)|A i | < 1 for all t ≥ t |A| , which implies 0 < c(t − 1) < 1 for all t ≥ t |A| and the column sums of c(t−1) −1 R(t−1) equal 1. Let v(t − 1) ||π * (t − 1) −π * (t)||. And consider t ≥ t |A| , then inequality (12) becomes:
whereπ(t − 1) andπ * (t − 1) are both stochastic vectors whose sum of elements is equal to one. And by the construction of Q, we have Q(π(t − 1) −π * (t − 1)) = 0. Then inequality (13) becomes:
where c(t − 1) ∈ (0, 1) for all t ≥ t |A| . With inequality log(1 − x) < −x, ∀x ∈ (0, 1), for any t > t |A| and t * 3 ≥ t |A| , we have :
Note that inequality (14) holds for any t * 3 ≥ t |A| . And by Lemma 3, v(τ ) is summable, we first take the limit of t and then take the limit of t * 3 , by the summability of v(τ ), we can have lim 
Combining inequalities (11) and (15), we can get for any t * 3 > t ∨ :
By (2) in Assumption 2,
By Lemma 2, we have
is strictly decreasing to 0. And there exists a positive constant C q such that x(t * 3 ) ≤ C q . Therefore, for any t * 3 > t ∨ and t > t * 3 + 1, (16) becomes:
Therefore we reach Claim 3. 2
Claim 4. lim t→∞ ||π(t) −π(t)|| = 0 and there exists some t c such that for any t * 4 ≥ t c + 1 and t ≥ t * 4 ,
for some constant C c > 0.
With (17) becomes:
Based on Lemma 1, the nonzero entries in {P˜ (t−1) } T can be represented as polynomials of {˜ i (t − 1), 1 −˜ i (t − 1)}. Taking the nonzero entry
|Ai| , we can decompose {P˜ (t−1) } T into the following:
, where Q is a |Z| × |Z| matrix with all entries are 1. Because P˜ (t−1) is a transition matrix, then the {P˜ (t−1) } T is a column stochastic matrix where each column sum is equal to 1. It follows that the column sums of
i (t − 1)|A i |, and the column sums of R (t − 1) equal
Let x(t) = ||π(t) −π(t)||. And by the structure of Q and the fact that π(t − 1) andπ(t − 1) are both stochastic vectors whose sum of elements is equal to 1, we have Q(π(t − 1) −π(t − 1)) = 0. Then (18) becomes:
By (4) in the proof of Lemma 1, any entry in P˜ (t−1) can be represented as a summation of at most 2 N polynomials. And each polynomial is a product of N monomials; e.g.,
|Ai| . And the entries in P (t−1) have the same form with˜ i (t − 1) = i (t − 1). Then the difference of any pair of entries (P˜ (t−1) (x, y), P (t−1) (x, y)) has at most 4 N terms (for example,
|Ai| has 2 N − 1 terms). And each term is less than
where ||e(t)|| ∞ = max{|e 1 c (t)|, · · · , |e N c (t)|}. Then any pair of entries (P˜ (t−1) (x, y), P (t−1) (x, y)) satisfy that:
Then (19) becomes:
Then from (20), we can get:
. (21) Inequality (21) holds for any t ≥ 2. Recall that˜ i (t) ∈ (0, 1], ∀i ∈ V, ∀t, then c(t − 1) ≤ 1. By simple algebraic operations, we have c(t
And by (1) and (3) in Assump-
( i (t−1)+||e(t−1)|| ∞ ) converges to 0. Therefore, there exists a t c such that
By manipulating inequality log(1−x) < −x, ∀x ∈ (0, 1) and exp(−x) < 1, ∀x > 0, (21) can be rewritten for all t * 4 ≥ t c + 1 and t ≥ t * 4 as follows:
Plug χ(t) = x(t) − 4 N e r (t) and c(t) = 1 − N i=1˜ i (t)|A i | in the above inequality, and we have:
By Assumption 2 -(2),
And by Assumption 2 -(3), lim
4 N e r (t * 4 ) = 0. We first take the limit of t and then take the limit of t * 4 , we can have lim 
Therefore we reach Claim 4. 2
Combining Claim 3 and Claim 4, we get that for Markov chain M, its state distribution {π(t)} converges to limiting distribution π * . Moreover, by triangle inequality, Claim 3 and Claim 4, there exists some t min = max{t ∨ , t c } and C ≥ max{C q , 4C , C c , 4 N }, such that for any t * > t min and t > t * + 1, inequality (1) holds. It completes the proof of Theorem 1. 2
Proof of Corollary 2
PROOF. From the last two paragraph of Section 5.3, the constant C in inequality (1) can be estimated as
N }. Now we will prove that there exists a set of feasible constants
From Claim 3, C q can be any constant that satisfies PROOF. Expanding the right hand side of (25) yields the sum of at most 2 N monomials where each monomial is a product of
And there are
Since |V ex (x, y)| ≤ N here we use the upper bound
where |T | is the number of edges of tree T . For the analytical simplicity, denote the enumeration of edges in T as E(T ) = {g 1 , g 2 , · · · , g |T | } and denote by d lg (g) the coefficient of the l g -th degree term in the polynomial P (t) (x, y), where l g ∈ {0, · · · , N }. Then
, which can be expanded as the sum of (N + 1) |T | monomials where each monomial is in the form of
where m ∈ {0, · · · , N |T |}. Finding combinations of (l g1 , · · · , l g |T | ) such that l g1 + · · · + l g |T | = m can be cast to the problem of obtaining m points on |T | N + 1-sided dice (pages 23-24 in Uspensky (1937) ). The number of all possible combinations equals the coefficient of
By generalizing the solution of problem 13 in Uspensky (1937) , we can get the
where · is the floor function. And by multinomial theorem (Section 24.1.2 in Abramowitz and Stegun (1964) ), the summation of all coefficients in
Note that any tree T ∈ G (t) (z) is a spanning tree of the graph G( (t)) where each vertex is a state z ∈ Z.
6 Case studies
In this section, we will evaluate the RL algorithm using two applications; i.e., the demand allocation market in Zhu (2014) and the cyber security scenario in Okhravi et al. (2014) .
Case 1: Demand allocation market
In this section, we study a power market which consists of N customers and a system operator. Each customer wants to allocate its demands in near future time slots and its action is subject to a price enforced by the system operator.
System components
Customers. We consider N customers V = {1, · · · , N } and each customer i ∈ V has power demands x i ≥ 0 and wants to allocate its demands in one time slot within A i = {1, 2, · · · , |A i |}. The action a i ∈ A i is the time slot chosen by customer i. Each customer wants to satisfy its demands as soon as possible so it punishes late allocation. The cost function c i :
System operator. The system operator charges each customer some price based on demand distributions. In particular, given an action profile Utility. The utility of customer i is the negative of the cost and price:
Informational constraint. Each customer is unwilling to share its cost function c i and private action a i with other customers and the system operator. And the system operator does not want to disclose the pricing policy to the customers and only agrees to publicize the price value p a (s) given s. Therefore, each customer only knows its own utility values instead of the structure of the utility function.
Evaluation
Evaluation setup. In this section, we use Matlab simulations to evaluate the performance of the RL algorithm. Similar to the setup in Zhu (2014) , we consider 100 customers and they have identical action sets consisting of 10 time slots. The demands of all customers are 1; i.e., x i = 1 for any i ∈ V. The cost function for customer i is set as c i (
, where ρ i > 0 and ξ i > 1. And the pricing mechanism is p a (Ξ a i (s)) = Ξ a i (s). Nash equilibrium. By Lemma 2.1 in Zhu (2014) , we know that the demand allocation game under the above setup is a potential game, and then a weakly acyclic game Monderer and Shapley (1996) . Therefore the existence of pure Nash equilibrium is guaranteed.
Simulation results with diminishing exploration rates. As discussed in Section 4.4, we restrict the exploration rates to be p-series. In particular, Figures 2 -4 show the evaluations of the RL algorithm for three cases i (t) = (the optimal one), respectively. The exploration deviations are chosen as e i (t) = 9 10t 2 and the measurement noises are absent; i.e., w i (t) = 0. The duration of the simulation is 2,000 iterations. The simulation results confirm the convergence of the action profiles in Theorem 1. In addition, the convergence in Figure 4 is fastest where the optimal exploration rates i (t) = Simulation results with measurement errors. In this part, we evaluate how the RL algorithm performs when the measurement noises are present. The exploration rates are chosen as i (t) = Figures 5 -6 show that the action profiles slow down and oscillate with larger magnitudes when the noise magnitude increases. In addition, we also evaluate how the RL algorithm performs when Assumption 1 is violated. In particular, w i (t) is uniformly distributed over the time-dependent interval [−10 log(t), 10 log(t)]. The result shown in Figures 7 implies that the action profiles do not converge anymore. 
Case 2: Adaptive cyber defense scenario
In this section, we study a real-world cyber security scenario which consists of two players: the defender and attacker. The system is the server containing several zeroday security vulnerabilities. A zero-day attack happens once that a software/hardware vulnerability is exploited by the attacker before software the engineers develop any patch to fix the vulnerability. The attacker is equipped with a set of zero-day attack scripts denoted as A and the defender is equipped with a set of platforms denoted as D. The defender uses a defensive technique called dynamic platforms Okhravi et al. (2014) , which changes the properties of the server such that it is harder for the attacker to succeed. The components in the cyber security scenario and the interactions among the components will be discussed in the following paragraphs.
System components
Defender. The defender has a set of different platforms; e.g., different versions of operating systems and architectures. The defender periodically restarts the server, chooses one platform from D and deploys it on the server each time it restarts the server. The iteration denoted in Section 2.1 is the defense period in this scenario. The action d(t) is the platform deployed at iteration t.
Attacker. The attacker has a set of zero-day attack scripts, where each attack script can only succeed on some platforms, but no the others. The attacker periodically chooses one of the attack scripts to attack the server. Notice that the attack period is often smaller than the defense period because the defender cannot restart the server too frequently due to the resource consumption of restarting the server. In fact, the defense period is usually a multiple of the attack period. The attack action at iteration t, denoted as a(t), is a subset of the attack scripts and the attack action set A includes all possible subsets. The order of choosing the attack scripts in one iteration does not matter.
Server. Once an attack action succeeds, the attacker can control the server for a certain amount of time. And every time the server restarts, the defender takes over the control of the server. And here we assume the time consumed by the attack scripts to succeed and the time consumed by restarting the server are negligible compared with the length of an iteration.
Utility. The goal of both the attacker and defender is to gain longer control time of the server. The utility of the defender u d (d(t), a(t)) is the fraction of the time controlled by the defender during iteration t and the utility of the attacker u a (d(t), a(t)) is the fraction of the time controlled by the attacker. Notice that u d (d(t), a(t)) + u a (d(t), a(t)) = 1.
Informational constraint. The attacker can observe when the server restarts, so it knows the iterations, but it does not know the defender's action set D and which platform is deployed. The defender does not know the attacker's action set A and the specific attack scripts chosen by the attacker. At the end of each defense period, both the defender and attacker can measure how much time they control the server. Therefore, each player only knows its own utility values instead of the structure of the utility function.
Evaluation
Evaluation setup. In this section, we use Matlab simulations to evaluate the performance of our algorithm based on real-world platform settings, attack scripts and server control data (Okhravi et al., 2012 (Okhravi et al., , 2014 . The total number of defense actions is 5; i.e., the defender has five different platforms: Fedora 11 on x86, Gentoo 9 on x86, Debian 6 on x86, FreeBSD 9 on x86, and CentOS 6.3 on x86. The attacker has two zero-day attack scripts: TCP MAXSEG exploit, and Socket Pairs exploit. The defense period is set to be ten times as large as the attack period; i.e., during one iteration, the attacker launches 10 attack scripts. Since the time consumed by the attack scripts to succeed is negligible, one attack script enables the attacker control 1 10 of the iteration if it succeeds. The total number of attack actions is 11; i.e., a 1 = (0, 10), a 2 = (1, 9), · · · , a 11 = (10, 0), where a(t) = (0, 10) means the attacker launches 0 TCP MAXSEG exploit and 10 Socket Pairs exploits at iteration t.
Real-world utility values. Based on the evaluation setup and the real-world attack scripts, we first replay different attack actions on different platforms to get the utility table for the defender and the attacker. The results are shown in Table 1 , where the defender is the row player and the attacker is the column player. In each cell, the first number represents the utility value to the defender, and the second number represents the utility value to the attacker. Nash equilibrium. By Proposition 1 in Takahashi and Yamamori (2002) , we know any 2-player finite game and its any sub-game (any game constructed by restricting the set of actions to a subset of the set of actions in the original game) has at least one pure Nash equilibrium is a weakly acyclic game. From Table 1 , we can see any subgame has at least one pure Nash equilibrium. Now we want to calculate the pure Nash equilibrium (equilibria). From Table 1 , we can see if the defense strategy is d 4 (deploying Debian 6) or d 5 (deploying FreeBSD 9), then the utility of the defender is 1 (the utility of the attacker is 0) not matter what action the attacker uses. From Definition 1 and Remark 2, we know the combinations of any attacker action and defense action d 4 or d 5 are pure Nash equilibria.
Simulation results with optimal exploration rates. Based on Table 1 , we simulate the interactions of the defender and attacker in Matlab. We choose the exploration rates d (t) = a (t) = 1 11t 1/2 ., the optimal one among p-series as discussed in Section 4.4. The exploration deviations are chosen as e d (t) = 1 110t 2 and e a (t) = 1 110t 2 . We assume that the measurement noises are absent; i.e., w d (t) = w a (t) = 0. The duration of each simulation (from the attack begins till the attack ends) is 10,000 iterations and we repeat 100 identical simulations. Figure 9 shows the trajectories of the defense and attack actions in one certain simulation. And for each simulation, we record the defense action at each iteration. Then at each iteration t, we have 100 chosen defense actions and we use the number of each defense action over 100 as the probability of choosing such defense action at t. The result in Figure 9 suggests that the defense action converges to the set {d 4 , d 5 }. Notice that the combinations of any attacker action and defense action d 4 or d 5 are pure Nash equilibria. Then the simulation results confirm that the convergence of the action profiles to the set of pure Nash equilibria.
Conclusion
This paper investigates a class of multi-player discrete games where each player aims to maximize its own utility function with limited information about the game of interest. We propose the RL algorithm which converges to the set of action profiles which have maximal stochastic potential with probability one. The convergence rate of the proposed algorithm is analytically quantified. Moreover, the performance of the algorithm is verified by two case studies in the smart grid and cybersecurity.
